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EXECUTING THE INSANE: A LOOK AT DEATH PENALTY
SCHEMES IN ARKANSAS, GEORGIA AND TEXAS
Faced with such widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign
power, this Court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner
who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the condemnedfrom fear and
pain without comfort of understanding,or to protect the dignity of society
itselffrom the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction
finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2004 Charles Singleton ("Singleton"), a man treated
often for schizophrenia and psychotic delusions, was executed by the State
of Arkansas.2 Three months prior, on November 4, 2003, the State of
Georgia executed James Willie Brown ("Brown"), a man long diagnosed
as a paranoid schizophrenic. A third man, Kelsey Patterson ("Patterson"),
1 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
2 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2004,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=839 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007);
see also Alan A. Stone, Condemned Prisoner Treated and Executed, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES,
Mar., 2004, Vol. XXI, Issue 3; Kate Randall, Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics, Mentally ill Inmate Put to Death after Medical "Treatment" Prepares Execution,
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/dll/singletonexecuted.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007);
Kevin
Drew,
Arkansas
Prepares to
Execute
Mentally Ill
Inmate,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/05/singleton.death.row/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2007);
Margaret
Kimberly,
The
Disturbing
Death
of
Charles
Singleton,
http://www.valleyadvocate.com/gbase/News/content.html?oid=oid:51650 (last visited Feb.
8, 2007); Ellen Goodman, The Lunacy of Law, http://www.nwanews.com/adg/
News/19914/print! (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
3 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2003,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=464 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007);
see
also
International
Justice
Project,
James
Willie
Brown,
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessJBrown.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007);
Georgia Department of Corrections, News Release, Brown Execution Media Advisory,
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/NewsRoom/PressReleases/031031.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2007); Georgia Attorney General, Press Advisory, Attorney General Baker Announces
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who struggled with paranoid schizophrenia for more than twenty years,
was executed by the State of Texas on May 18, 2004. 4
Despite the fact that these men all struggled with severe mental
disorders, they were nonetheless found competent to be executed under
their respective state statutory schemes.
In 1986, the Supreme Court
handed down Ford v. Wainwright, holding it unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment to inflict the death penalty upon an insane prisoner. 6 It
is up to the states, however, to build or adjust statutory schemes that fall in
line with the Court's holding.7
This note, guided by stories of three mentally ill defendants, will
explore statutory death penalty and habeas corpus schemes in Arkansas,
Georgia and Texas and their respective application to individuals with
severe mental illness. Part II will examine the history of the death penalty,
the habeas corpus process and mental illness, looking specifically at the
Eighth Amendment as well as the landmark decisions Ford v. Wainwright
and Atkins v. Virginia. Part III will discuss in further detail the current
statutes in Arkansas, Georgia and Texas. Part IV will take a closer look at
these three specific cases involving mentally ill defendants. Part V will
analyze the implications of applying Atkins to defendants suffering from
severe mental illness and, more specifically, how such an application
would affect current death penalty statutes in Arkansas, Georgia and
Texas. Finally, Part VI will conclude this note emphasizing the pressing
need for the exclusion of mentally ill offenders from death penalty eligibility.
Execution

of

James

Willie

Brown,

http://www.state.ga.us/ago/press/press.cgi?

prfile=PR.20031023.01 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); North Georgia's Newsroom, Georgia
Executes Man for Murder of Topless Dancer, http://www.accessnorthga.com/
news/halLnewfullstory.asp?ID=76102 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).

4 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2004,

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=839

(last visited Feb. 8, 2007);

David
Carson,
Texas
Execution
Information
Center, Kelsey
Patterson,
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/322.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); see also Attorney
General of Texas, Media Advisory: Kelsey Patterson Scheduled for Execution,
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/release.php?id=461 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); International Justice Project, Kelsey Patterson, http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessKPatterson.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
5 David Carson, Texas Execution Information Center, Kelsey Patterson,
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/322.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); see also Amnesty
International, Urgent Action, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511232004
(last visited Feb. 8, 2007); Alan A. Stone, M.D., Condemned PrisonerTreated and Executed, PSYCHIATRIC TIMEs, Mar., 2004, Vol. XXI, Issue 3; National Mental Health Association, News Release, James Willie Brown to Die for His Mental Illness,
http://wwwl.nmha.org/newsroom/system/news.vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=470 (last visited Feb.
8, 2007).
6 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
7 Id
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II. HISTORY

The idea of a penalty of death as punishment for criminal behavior
has existed since the earliest periods of North American history and is currently statutorily recognized by thirty-eight states as well as by the United
States Government and Military.8 While its purpose is continuously debated, the most pervasive justification for the death penalty is the idea of
retribution. 9 Retribution is most often referred to as a notion of "justice,"
but is better defined by the legendary philosophy, "an eye for an eye." 10
Regardless of its justification, the death penalty is well established in the
United States and is consistently used in our criminal justice system."
Since 1976 more than one thousand people have been executed, many of
12
them mentally ill.

Despite the fact that mentally ill defendants can be incapable of
13
comprehending reality, they continue to be executed for their crimes.
One reason for this is that until the 1980's, mental illness itself was illdefined and often misunderstood. 14 These misconceptions have been
somewhat corrected due to strides in the field of psychology, and recognition of mental illness by the Supreme Court. 15 Today, mental illness is
8 Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); see also JAMES
R. ACKER ET AL., AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5-8 (Carolina Academic Press 1998) (giving a brief description of the death penalty in the United States);
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267-305 (Harvard University Press 2002) (describing the development of the death penalty from 1972 to 2002);
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY 62-74 (Oxford University Press 2002) (describing the
history of the death penalty in North America); VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY 10
(Thomson West 2d. ed. 2005) (2003) (giving brief history on the death penalty); Editorial
Board, The Death Penalty Experiment: The Facts Behind the Conclusions, 29 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 223 (2004) (providing a detailed history of the death penalty in the United States).
9 See VICTOR L. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY 10 (Thomson West 2d. ed. 2005) (2003)
(describing justifications for death penalty); see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 116-23 (Harvard University Press 2002) (describing the
notion of retribution); HUGO BEDAU ET AL., DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 55-58 (Oxford
University Press 2004) (describing idea of retribution as justification for the death penalty).
10 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
I See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12 Death
Penalty Information Center, Facts About the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
13 See generally Joel Schumm, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 49 Nov REST
GESTAE 43 (Nov. 2005) (providing brief overview of the death penalty as related to mental
illness); John W. Parry, The Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities:A Lethal
Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of Violence, and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness,29
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 667 (Sep./Oct. 2005) (describing societal attitudes
toward individuals with mental disabilities).
14 National Mental Health Association, NMHA and the History of the Mental Health
Movement, http://wwwl.nmha.org/about/history.cftn (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
15 National Mental Health Association, NMHA and the History of the Mental Health
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defined as "any of various conditions characterized by impairment of an
individual's normal cognitive, emotional, or behavioral functioning, and16
caused by social, psychological, biochemical, genetic or other factors."'
The most common mental illnesses experienced by defendants include:
bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, post-traumatic
stress disorder, depression and borderline personality disorder. 17
Historically, mentally ill defendants were not protected from a sentence of death.1 8 As written in the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.' 9 What constitutes "cruel and unusual" has been hotly contested for decades.2 ° Interpretations of the Eighth
Amendment in landmark Supreme Court decisions, however, seek to protect those who cannot comprehend the punishment they face.2 ' One of
these decisions was Ford v. Wainwright, handed down by the Court in
22
In 1974, petitioner Ford was convicted of murder in Florida and
1986.
sentenced to death.23 While he indicated no signs of mental illness
throughout the trial, in early 1982 Ford's behavior began to change drastically. 24 He became confused, paranoid and suffered from delusions of
grandeur. 25 In 1983, a psychologist diagnosed Ford with "a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which closely resembles 'Paranoid Schizophrenia
Movement, http://wwwl.nmha.org/about/history.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); see also
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (holding it unconstitutional to execute a
prisoner suffering from mental illness).
16 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ( t h ed. 2000).
4
17 Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=782&scid=66 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
18 See EMILY FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY PENALTY 159-61 (University Press of America 1993) (describing a study regarding mentally ill defendants and the death penalty); see
also Dan Malone, Cruel and Inhumane: Executing the Mentally Ill, AMNESTY MAGAZINE,
Fall 2005.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imlosed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
See HUGO BEDAU ET AL., DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 51-52 (Oxford University

Press 2004) (describing Louis P. Pojman's stance on why the death penalty is permissible).
But see HUGO BEDAU ET AL., DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 19-20 (Oxford University

Press 2004) (describing Hugo Adam Bedau's thoughts on "cruel and unusual punishment").
21 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399 (1986) (holding execution of a presently
insane death row prisoner unconstitutional).
21

Id. at 399.

23 Id. After reading about a Ku Klux Klan rally, Ford developed an obsession with the
Klan. Id. He became increasingly convinced he had become the target of a complex conspiracy. Id. Later, he began to believe his female relatives were being held hostage and
tortured. Id. at 399. This delusion expanded until Ford was reporting that 135 of his
friends and family as well as senators and other leaders were being held hostage in prison.
Id In a letter from 1983, Ford claimed to have ended the hostage crises by firing prison
officials. Id. He began referring to himself as "Pope John Paul III" and reported having
appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 399.
24 See Ford,477 U.S. at 402.
25 Id.
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With Suicide Potential."'' 26 When asked if he would be executed, Ford
stated, "I can't be executed because of27the landmark case. I won. Ford v.
State will prevent executions all over."
Based on Ford's rapidly declining mental state, counsel invoked
procedures of Florida law governing the determination of competency of a
condemned inmate.2 8 Following the procedures set forth by Florida law,
the Governor appointed three psychologists to determine whether Ford had
"the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the
reasons why it was imposed upon him.",29 While the psychologists were in
accord on the question of Ford's sanity, their diagnoses differed. 30 Despite
this evidence, the Governor proceeded to sign a death warrant without
explanation or statement. 3' Following an unsuccessful attempt to schedule
a state court hearing to determine anew Ford's competency to be executed,
Ford's counsel filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida.32 The district court denied the
petition without a hearing.33 After a divided court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision, the Supreme Court granted Ford's petition for
certiorari in order to resolve an important issue: whether the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of the insane and, if so, whether the
district court should have held a hearing on petitioner's claim.34
26

Id. After being diagnosed, Ford subsequently refused to be seen again, believing the

doctor to have joined the conspiracy against him. Id. at 403. Ford's counsel was forced to
seek assistance from a new doctor. Id.
27 Id. at 403. After hearing Ford's statements, a doctor concluded that "there was no
reasonable possibility that Mr. Ford was dissembling, malingering or otherwise putting on a
performance..." Id.One month later, Ford regressed further, speaking only in an incomprehensible code. Id.
28
29

Id.

Id. at 404. At one meeting, Ford met with three psychiatrists who interviewed him

for approximately thirty minutes. Id. Following the meeting, each doctor was to file a
separate two or three page report with the Governor. Id.
30 Id. at 404. "One doctor concluded that Ford suffered from 'psychosis with paranoia'
but had 'enough cognitive functioning to understand the nature and effects of the death
penalty, and why it is to be imposed on him."' Id.Another described Ford as "psychotic,"
however, he stated that Ford "did 'know fully what can happen to him."' Id. The third
doctor found that Ford had "a 'severe adaptational disorder,' but did 'comprehend his total
situation including being sentenced to death, and all of the implications of that penalty."'
Id. at 404.
31

id.

32

Id.

31 Id. at 404.
34 Id. at 405. The panel majority for the Court of Appeals decided that Ford's conten-

tion was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Solesbee v. Balkcom, a case that
examined a state statute which was, in the court's opinion, "virtually identical" to the Florida statute. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 528 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 399
(1986). The majority quoted the Court in Solesbee, stating, "We are unable to say that it
offends due process for a state to deem its Governor an 'apt and special tribunal' to pass
upon a question so closely related to powers that from the beginning have been entrusted to

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

98

[Vol. XII

In 1986, Justice Marshall delivered the Court's opinion holding it
unconstitutional "to exact in penance the life of one whose mental illness
prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications." 35 Additionally, the Court found the Florida statute failed to provide adequate assurances of accuracy in determining a person's competency. 36 While the Court found a full trial on the issue of sanity unnecessary, it suggested that the State should develop appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences.37
Fifteen years following the Ford decision, in 2002, the Court
handed down Atkins v. Virginia.38 Petitioner Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery and capital murder in the State of Virginia. 39 Despite testimony presented by a forensic psychologist concluding Atkins
was "mildly mentally retarded," he was nonetheless sentenced to death
because of two aggravating circumstances. 40 Additionally, the State presented a rebuttal witness who testified that Atkins was not mentally retarded but was of "average intelligence, at least" and diagnosed him as
having antisocial personality disorder.4 ' On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the imposition of the death penalty, rejecting Atkins'
contention "that he is mentally retarded and thus cannot be sentenced to
death. 4 2 Based on the concerns presented by the dissenters on appeal, the

Supreme Court granted certiorari.43
Justice Stevens delivered the Court's opinion, concluding that under the Eighth Amendment, in light of "evolving standards of decency," it
would be excessive to punish a mentally retarded offender with a penalty
Governors." Id.
31 See Ford,477 U.S. at 417 (noting the Court's decision to explicitly recognize in law
a principle that had long resided there).
36 Id. The majority found two deficiencies in the Florida statute. Id. at 413.
First,
Florida's procedure failed to include the prisoner in the "truth-seeking process." Id. The
Court stated, "we believe any procedure that precludes the prisoner or his counsel from
presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars consideration of that material by the factfinder is necessarily inadequate." Id. at 414. Second, the Court held that there was a related deficiency in Florida's statute because it provided no opportunity to challenge the
state-appointed psychiatrists' findings. Id. at 415.
"7 Id. at417.
38 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding it unconstitutional to
execute a
mentally retarded defendant).
39 Id. at 307. On August 16, 1996 Atkins and William Jones abducted Eric Nesbitt,
robbed him, drove him to an automated teller machine, took him to an isolated location,
and shot and killed him. Id.
40

Id. at 309.

41 Id. The psychologist based his conclusion on interviews with people who knew

Atkins, a review of school and court records, and the administration of a standard intelligence test which indicated that Atkins had an IQ of 59. Id.
42 Id. The court was unwilling to commute Atkins' sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because of his IQ score. Id.
43

Id.
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of death. 44 Through its opinion, the Court created a categorical exception
for mentally retarded individuals, stating that while their mental deficiencies did not warrant an exception from criminal sanctions, they diminished
their personal culpability.4 5 Further, the Court stated that the imposition of
the death penalty on a mentally retarded person failed to serve two main
purposes of capital punishment: retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes.46
Following the Ford and Atkins decisions, scholars in both the legal
and psychology fields began to advocate for a similar categorical exemption for mentally ill individuals.47 Many states, as well as the Model Penal
Code, already permit defendants to offer evidence that an offense was
committed "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 48 Additionally, several states allow mental illness to be considered
by the jury as a mitigating factor that could reduce a defendant's culpability. 49 Several of the provisions specify that the impairment must be due to
44 Id. at 321.
45 See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
46

Id. at 321.

47 See generally Dan Malone, Cruel and Inhumane: Executing the Mentally
1ll, Am-

nesty International,Fall 2005; John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Killing the NonWilling: Atkins, the Volitionally Incapacitated,and the Death Penalty, 55 S.C. L. REv. 93
(2003); Melinda S. Campbell, Sell, Singleton, and Forcible Medication- Running Roughshod Over Liberty, 35 U. TOL. L. REv. 691 (2004); Timothy S. Hall, Mental Status and
Criminal CulpabilityAfter Atkins v. Virginia, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 355 (2004); Laurie T.
Izutsu, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants with Severe Mental Illness, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 995 (2005); Christoper Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with
Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REv. 293 (2003); American Psychological Association, Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United States (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.apa.org/pi/deathpenalty.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); National Mental Health
Association, News Release, NMHA Announces Position on Death Penalty (Apr. 2001),
available at http://nmha.org/newsroom/system/news.vw.cftn?do=vw&rid=276 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2007).
48 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(1) (2004) (stating that "[m]itigating
circumstance shall include.. .the capital murder was committed while the defendant was under
extreme mental or emotional disturbance"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West 2004)
(stating that "...it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance"); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 641 (2005) (stating that "[t]he fact that the accused intentionally caused the death
of another person under the influence of extreme emotional distress is a mitigating circumstance"); HAW. REv. STAT § 707-702 (2005) (stating that "[i]n a prosecution for murder or
attempted murder in the first and second degree it is an affirmative defense, which reduces
the offense to manslaughter or attempted manslaughter, that the defendant was.. .under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance"); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 163.135
(West 2006) (stating that "[it is an affirmative defense to murder.. .that the homicide was
committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance"); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.6 (2001) (stating that "[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance").
49 See supra note 48 (providing several examples of states that allow mental or emotional distress to be considered as a mitigating circumstance).
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"mental disease or defect" or "mental illness."50 Even further, state death
penalty statutes currently include mental illness as a mitigating factor with

respect to execution, allowing a defendant to request competency hearings
prior to being executed.5 1
The fact that both mental illness and incompetence have been codified in state death penalty statutes reflects the increasingly widespread
agreement that defendants with several mental illnesses should be excluded from capital punishment.52 This notion has been supported by the
professional, religious and legal communities. 53 Both the American Psychological Association ("APA") and the National Mental Health Association ("NMHA") have taken positions opposing capital punishment for persons with mental illness. 54 Similarly, several churches, as well as Amnesty
International, have spoken out against the death penalty.55
Despite the prohibitions set forth by the Eighth Amendment and
Ford, hundreds of mentally ill defendants still remain on death row.56
5o See, e.g., TEX. [PENAL] CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2005) (stating that "[i]t is an
affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a
result of severe mental disease or defect, did non know that his conduct was wrong").
51 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-86-111 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-68 (West

2005); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (Vernon 2005).
52 See supra note 51.

53 See supra note 47.
54 See American Psychological Association, Resolution on the Death Penalty in the
United States (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/deathpenalty.html. This
resolution states:
[W]hereas death penalty prosecutions may involve persons with serious mental
illness ... the American Psychological Association calls upon each jurisdiction in
the United States that imposes capital punishment not to carry out the death penalty until the jurisdiction implements policies and procedures that can be shown
through psychological and other social science research to ameliorate the deficiencies identified....
Id. See also National Mental Health Association, News Release, NMHA Announces Position on Death Penalty (Apr. 2001), available at http://nmha.org/newsroom/system/news.vw.cfm?do=vw&rid=276 (stating "the NMHA Board called upon state governments 'to suspend using the death penalty until more just, accurate and systematic ways of
determining and considering a defendant's mental status are developed."').
55 See Amnesty International, Statement Against the Death Penalty, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyreligious.org/education/statements/aiusa.htm
(stating "Amnesty
International opposes the death penalty in all cases without reservation."); see also United
Methodist Church, Capital Punishment, availableat http://www.deathpenaltyreligious.org/
education/statements/umc.html; United States Catholic Conference, Statement on Capital
Punishment (Mar. 1978), available at http://www.deathpenaltyreligious.org/education/statements/catholicconference.html (declaring "Catholic bishops of the United States
declared their opposition to capital punishment. . . continue to support this position in the
belief that a return to the use of the death penalty can only lead to the further erosion of
respect for life in our society").
See Amnesty International, The execution of mentally ill offenders,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR510032006 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (describing current situation as to mentally ill offenders on death row); see also NAACP De-
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Usually they are left with a single option: to begin the long, and often frustrating, habeas corpus process. 57 Generally, the purpose of a habeas corpus petition is not to determine a prisoner's guilt, but to test whether a
prisoner has been accorded due process. 8 In order to protect individuals
from wrongful imprisonment, prisoners hold the privilege of habeas corpus.5 9 Additionally, the process serves as a check on the way in which state
courts pay respect to individuals' constitutional rights.6 °
For a defendant, the appeals process begins immediately following
conviction. 61 All avenues of direct appeal must be exhausted and finalized.62 At this point, an application for writ of habeas corpus must be filed
in the state district court where the defendant was convicted.6 3 The case
will then proceed to the state's court of criminal appeals.64 If the state writ
is unsuccessful, a defendant may then file the writ in federal district
court.6 5 If the writ is unsuccessful in district court, a defendant may then
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals as well as petition the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.66
While a writ of habeas corpus serves as an important appellate right
for prisoners, the process has its downfalls.67 The application and process
for filing is complicated, and must usually be handled by an appellate attorney specializing in habeas corpus appeals.6 8 In addition, the habeas
corpus process can take months, and even years, as defendants must exhaust all direct appeals before they can even begin habeas corpus appeals. 69 Despite its disadvantages, a writ of habeas corpus is usually a
defendant's only option. 0
Prisoners whose competency to stand execution is questionable,
like the individuals discussed in this note, generally appeal on the basis of
fense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A. (2006), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSAWinter 2006.pdf (reporting most
recent death row statistics).
57 See generally, Brent Newton, A Primer on Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Review,
29 CHAMPION 16 (JUNE 2005) (explaining the habeas corpus process).
58 See generally, Newton, supra note 57; James Gilvary, The Death Penalty Experiment: The Facts Behind the Conclusions, 29 U.DAYTON L. REV. 223 (2004) (describing the
death penalty and issues surrounding it).
59 See generally,Newton, supra note 57.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See
63 Id.
64 id.
65 Id.

generally, Newton, supra note 57.

66 See generally, Newton, supra note 57.
67 Id.

68 Id.
69
70

See generally, Newton, supra note 57.
Id.
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competency claims.71 Competency hearings, regulated by the Court's decision in Ford as well as by state statutes, are held in order to make a determination about the defendant's mental competency.7 2 Unless a state's
statutory requirement for incompetence is met, a sentence of death is likely
73
to be carried out.

III. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES

As previously mentioned, each state utilizing the death penalty has
developed its own competency statute within the habeas corpus process in
compliance with the Court's decision in Ford.74 Therefore, when a convicted defendant alleges that he is insane or incompetent to stand execution, he must proceed through the state's statutory scheme.7 5 While each
state's process is similar in framework, the definitions and language used
to define competency differ greatly.76
In Arkansas, a competency hearing is held when the insanity of the
convicted defendant is alleged as a ground for postponing or not carrying
out execution of any sentence. 77 If a defendant is determined to be incompetent, he or she cannot be executed under Arkansas law.78
71 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399 (1986).
72

Id.

73 Id.

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-86-111 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-68
(West 2005) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, this article provides the
exclusive procedure for challenging mental competency to be executed when such challenge is made subsequent to the time of conviction and sentence"); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 46.05 (Vernon 2005) ("A motion filed under this article must identify the proceeding in which the defendant was convicted, give the date of the final judgment, set forth
the fact that an execution date has been set if the date has been set, and clearly set forth
alleged facts in support of the assertion that the defendant is presently incompetent to be
executed").
75 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-86-111 (West 2001) ("The procedure provided in
this subchapter shall also be followed ... in any case in which the insanity of the convicted
defendant is alleged as a ground for postponing or not carrying out execution of any sentence imposed as part of the judgment of conviction of the defendant"); GA. CODE ANN. §
17-10-68 (West 2005); TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05 (Vernon 2005).
76 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-506(d)(1)(B) (2001) (stating a finding of incompetence requires "reasonable grounds for believing that an individual under sentence of death
is not competent to understand the nature and reasons for that punishment"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-60 (West 2005) (stating that "mentally incompetent to be executed means
that because of a mental condition the person is presently unable to know why he or she is
being punished and understand the nature of the punishment"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 46.05(h) (Vernon 2005) (stating that "a defendant is incompetent to be executed
if the defendant does not understand: (1) that he or she is to be executed and that the execution is imminent; and (2) the reason he or she is being executed").
77 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-86-111(2001).
78 id.
74
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In Georgia, the process for determining competency is explicitly
laid out in the statute. 79 Basically, a defendant files a complaint that challenges his competency to be executed. 80 By filing the application, the defendant specifically consents to submit to a state examination for the purpose of assessing competency. 8' Additionally, defendants have the opportunity to request a specific expert be appointed for the examination. 82 Under Georgia law incompetency means "that because of a mental condition
the person is presently unable to know why he or she is being punished
and understand the nature of the punishment. 83 If it is determined that the
inmate is incompetent to stand execution by a preponderance of the evidence, the court is to enter an appropriate order with respect to the scheduled execution. 84 If, however, a person found mentally incompetent regains their competency, the appropriate mental health official is required
to report such evidence to the court.8 5 If this happens, the court would
enter an appropriate order vacating any previously entered stay of execu86
tion.
In Texas, a defendant must first file a motion that clearly sets forth
the allegations of incompetence to be executed. 87 Upon receipt of the motion, the trial court shall determine whether the defendant raised substantial doubt as to competency.8 8 If the defendant successfully does so, the
trial court orders at least two mental health experts to examine the defendant to determine competency. 89 As defined by Texas law, a defendant is
incompetent to be executed if "the defendant does not understand that he
or she is to be executed and the execution is imminent; and the reason he
or she is being executed." 90

79 See GA. CODEANN. § 17-10-60-17-10-71(West 1998).
80 Id.
81
82
83
84
85
86

id.
id.
See GA. CODEANN. § 17-10-60-17-10-71(West 1998).

id.
id.
id.

87 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.05(h) (Vernon 2005).
88
89
90

Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. SINGLETON, BROWN AND PATTERSON

A. CharlesSingleton - Medical History

For Singleton, symptoms of mental illness began in the early
1980's, after entering prison.9' The State placed him on medication to
control anxiety and depression. 92 In 1987 Singleton began to suffer delusions, claiming demons possessed his cell and that his thoughts were taken
from him when he read the Bible. 93 Singleton's psychiatrist diagnosed
him as schizophrenic and prescribed antipsychotic medication. 94 Soon
after Singleton refused to take medication, his doctor ordered involuntarily
medication.95 In 1988 the
State took him off the antipsychotic drugs after
96
his condition improved.
Over the next several years Singleton went through cycles of improvement followed by the return of delusions and involuntary medication.97 In 1997, a prison psychiatrist diagnosed Singleton as suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia.98 Later in 1997, a prison medication review panel
ordered him to take antipsychotic drugs after finding he posed a danger to
himself and others. 99

In response to the order, Singleton's attorneys filed suit, arguing it
was unconstitutional for the state to restore Singleton's competency
through the use of forcible medication in order to execute him.' 00 In 2001,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Singleton be sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole.' 01 The State of Arkansas
appealed, and a divided full panel of the Eighth Circuit lifted a stay of execution for Singleton. 0 2 The court held that because he now voluntarily
takes medication and because Arkansas has an interest in having sane in-

91 See Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 2001) (describing Singleton's
prison experience and need for medication to control anxiety and depression shortly after
entering prison).
92
93
94

Id.
Id.
id.

95 See Singleton v. Norris,267 F.3d at 862.
96
97

Id.
Id. at 863.

98 Id. at 864.
99 Id.
10o Id.
102
102 Id. at 871.

id.
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mates, the side effect of sanity should not affect Singleton's sentence. 10 3
04
The Supreme Court declined to hear Singleton's case without comment.
B. Charles Singleton - Legal History
Charles Singleton's journey toward execution began in 1979.'0' He

was nineteen when he stabbed Mary Lou York to death while robbing a
small grocery store
in Hamburg, Arkansas. 0 6 He was convicted and sen10 7
tenced to death.

Singleton's conviction for felony murder was affirmed in November 1981 by the Arkansas Supreme Court. 10 8 The robbery conviction and
sentence, however, were vacated on double jeopardy grounds. 10 9 Arkansas
set his execution date for June 4, 1982 and the Arkansas Supreme Court
denied Singleton's petition for a stay." 10
Singleton promptly filed a petition for stay of execution in the
11
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. '
Among other things, Singleton claimed that he was not competent to be
executed under Ford.1 2 On June 1, 1982 the district court granted Singleton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that the
sentence of death was invalid under the Eighth Amendment because of
Arkansas' reliance on an invalid aggravating factor. 13 Although the court
sustained the conviction, it required the State to reduce Singleton's sentence to life in prison without parole." 14
Both Singleton and the State appealed the district court's order." 15
Id.
Id.
See Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d at 860 (noting Singleton's conviction date in Arkansas state court in 1979).
106
See Kevin Drew, Arkansas Prepares to Execute Mentally Ill Inmate,
103

104
105

http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/05/singleton.death.row/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
107 See Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d at 860 (explaining Singleton's sentences of death
for capital felony murder and life imprisonment for robbery).
108 Id.; see also Singleton v. State, 623 S.W.2d 180 (Ark. 1981) (holding that defendant
failed to show trial court committed irreversible error in failing to excuse for cause three
veniremen and murder victim's statements related to defendant's cutting her throat fell
under excited utterance exception to hearsay rule).
109 See Singleton v. State, 623 S.W.2d at 181 (explaining how Arkansas law prohibits
entry of judgment of conviction on capital felony murder and underlying specified felony).
110 See Singleton v. Norris,267 F.3d at 860.
11 Id.
112 Id. at 866 (reiterating Ford standard that to be competent for execution a prisoner
must be aware of the punishment he is about to receive and reason for it).
113 Id. (explaining that the State incorrectly relied on the theory that Ford committed the
crime for pecuniary gain).
114 Id. at 861.
15 Id.

106

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XII

Singleton sought to raise issues decided against him, namely the Ford
claim. 116 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision to uphold the conviction, but reinstated the sentence of death."'
On remand, Singleton challenged the reinstatement of the death sentence.118 In June of 1990, however, the district court dismissed his petition
and dissolved the stay of execution. 119
In 1992 Singleton filed a Ford claim in both state and federal courts
arguing he was incompetent to be executed. 120 In accordance with Ford,
Singleton sought an order that the State cease administration of antipsychotic drugs and conduct a psychiatric examination.' 12 The state court
held that Singleton had properly sought a mental examination, but denied
his motion. 22 On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Singleton
had been unconstitutionally denied a competency examination. 2 3 Meanwhile, the district court held Singleton's federal petition in abeyance until
the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled on the appeal. 2 4 After the Arkansas
Supreme Court issued its ruling, and following two hearings on the matter,
the district court dismissed Singleton's petition. 25 It held that Singleton,
who was at that time voluntarily taking antipsychotic medications, was
only competent to be executed. 26 On appeal, Singleton conceded that he
had no competency claim at that time, because he was voluntarily taking
medication and was competent while medicated. 27 A divided panel of the
Eighth Circuit reversed and directed the district court to grant Singleton's
habeas corpus petition, enter a permanent stay of 12execution
and reduce
8
Singleton's sentence to life in prison without parole.
Following the panel's holding, the State petitioned for a rehearing
en banc. Unfortunately for Singleton, the en banc court held that the
Eighth Amendment is not violated when a state "executes a prisoner who
became incompetent during his long stay on death row but who subsequently regained competency through appropriate medical care.' 2 9 The
court affirmed the district court's original denial of Singleton's habeas
Id. at 861.
Id.
18 Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d at 861.
116

117

119 Id.
20

See Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d at 861.

121 Id.
122

Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d at 861.

123
124

Id.
Id.at 862.

125
126

i.
Singleton v. Norris,267 F.3d at 862.

127

Id.

128

Id. at 871.
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003).

129

20071
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corpus petition and vacated the stay of execution.' 30 Almost twenty-five
years after being convicted and sentenced to death, Charles Singleton was
executed by lethal injection on January 6, 2004.131
C. James Willie Brown - MedicalHistory
At fifteen years old, in 1963, doctors diagnosed Brown as suffering
from convulsive disorder and prescribed medication to control Brown's
seizures. 32 He joined the Marine Corps when he was just eighteen years
old, but after sixteen months and two hospitalizations the military discharged him.133 He was arrested for the first time in 1968, but pled guilty
and was later committed to a state mental hospital.1 34 Brown was placed
on parole in 1972 and he voluntarily re-admitted himself into a state mental hospital. 135 He spent two years in state care and was released in January of 1974.136 Following his arrest for murder in 1975,
doctors diagnosed
137
Brown for the first time with paranoid schizophrenia.
Between the years 1975 and 1989, James Willie Brown was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia more than seventeen times. 138 He suffered psychosis, believing someone was trying to kill him through poisoning or germs. 3 9 Brown also had hallucinations of God and the devil. 4 °
Reports from 1977 describe him as "deranged, preaching the gospel and
signing his name as Jesus Christ."'14 1 Up until the time of his 2003 execuId.
131See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2004,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=839 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
132 See
Clark
Prosecutor,
James
Willie
Brown,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htmi/death/US/brown879.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007)
(providing a detailed history of Brown's childhood and teenage years).
133Id.
134See Brown v. State, 295 S.E.2d 727, 730 (Ga. 1982). Brown was arrested and
charged with assault with intent to rape, robbery, and two counts of assault with intent to
murder. Id.He was diagnosed with "Psychoneurotic Disorder, Dissociative Reaction," but
doctors nonetheless recommended he be returned to court for disposition of the charges. Id.
In December of 1968, Brown pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years for each count. Id.
135 See Brown v. State, 295 S.E.2d at 730. "This time doctors found Brown to be suffering from 'mild to moderate' degree of psychiatric impairment." Id.
130

136

Id.

Brown v. State, 295 S.E.2d at 730. An examining psychiatrist concluded that Brown
had severely deteriorated since his previous diagnosis and was now "overtly psychotic."
Id. He was diagnosed this time with "Schizophrenia, paranoid type." Id. It was based
upon this diagnosis that a special plea of insanity was sustained for Brown. Id.
138 International
Justice Project, James
Willie Brown Case Overview,
http://www.intemationaljusticeproject.org/illnessJBrown.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
39 Id.
140 Id.
141id.
137
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tion, Brown often fluctuated between periods of severe psychosis42 and stability, mostly due to psychotropic medications and tranquilizers.
D. James Willie Brown - Legal History

In 1975, James Willie Brown was charged with the rape and murder of Brenda Watson.143 He was found incompetent to stand trial, but was

eventually tried, convicted and sentenced to death for Watson's murder in
1981.14

His conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the Georgia

Supreme Court in 1982.145 In 1988, Brown succeeded on a habeas petition
in a federal district court. 14 6 The district court ordered
a retrial as well as a
"reliable determination" of Brown's competence. 47
Unfortunately for Brown, two evaluating physicians and a special
jury found him competent to stand trial once again. 148 In 1991, for a second time, he was tried, convicted and sentenced to death.149 In a final appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Brown's conviction and sentence were
affirmed and on November 4, 2003, James Willie Brown was executed by
150
lethal injection.
E. Kelsey Patterson- Medical History
Kelsey Patterson's journey toward execution began in 1980 when
he was charged with shooting Richard Noel Lane in Dallas, Texas. 151 He
142

International

Justice

Project,

James

Willie

Brown

Case

Overview,

http://www.internationaijusticeproject.org/illnessJBrown.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
143 See Brown v. State, 401 S.E.2d 492, 493 (Ga.
1991).
144

Id.

145 Id.
146

Id. at n.1.

147 Id.
148 Brown v. State, 401 S.E.2d at 493-94. Both psychiatrists were of the opinion that

Brown was unquestionably competent to stand trial. Id. According to both, Brown had not
been treated or medicated since 1982. Id. Additionally, he showed no indication of any
serious mental disorder. Id. A witness for the state testified that schizophrenia is "'for the
most part a lifelong illness with exacerbations of the illness ... and remissions,' agreeing
with the district attorney that schizophrenia is generally a 'degenerative type mental condition if left untreated,' as Brown has been since 1982." Id. Based on this, the witness concluded it was highly unlikely that Brown was schizophrenic and blamed his hallucination
on past abuse of hallucinogenic drugs. Id. at 495.
49 Id. at 493-94.
150 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2003,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=464 (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
151 International
Justice
Project,
Kelsey
Patterson
Case
Overview,
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessKPatterson.cfm
(last visited Feb. 10,
2007).
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was charged with attempted murder, but was found incompetent to stand
trial. 152 Psychiatrists first diagnosed Patterson with paranoid schizophrenia
in 1971 at the Dallas County Jail. 53 After being charged again with attempted murder and assault years later, Patterson spent several months in
the Terrell State Hospital. 154 Psychiatrists at the hospital again diagnosed
1 55
Patterson as paranoid schizophrenic, and discharged him a month later.
Patterson consistently suffered from delusions, usually involving
156
authority figures in his life, including prison officials and his lawyers.
He often described detailed conspiracies against him, he believed devices
were implanted in his body and believed the state gave him a permanent
stay of execution.1 57 After being convicted, Patterson refused all medical
treatment and any further attempts to diagnose him. 158 Additionally, while
on death row, Patterson refused to cooperate with his lawyers or even acknowledge their representation on his behalf. 159 Because of Patterson's
refusal to be treated, his uncontrolled symptoms made it nearly impossible
for him to communicate with the outside world. 160 Eventually, prison officials no longer attempted
to treat him, believing he did not pose a threat to
61
himself or others. 1

F. Kelsey Patterson- Legal History

In 1992, Kelsey Patterson was charged with the murders of Louis
Oates and Dorothy Harris.162 At the time of his arrest, Texas' standard for
incompetency was more stringent than today's, making it a more difficult
evidentiary standard for defendants to meet. 163 While psychiatrists did not
dispute Patterson's mental illness, they nonetheless concluded he was
competent under the standard. 164 He was eventually found competent to
stand trial, and on July 1, 1993 Patterson was convicted and sentenced to
152

id.

153
154
155

Id.
Id.

International
Justice
Project,
Kelsey
Patterson
Case
Overview,
http://www.intemationaljusticeproject.org/illnessKPatterson.cfm (last visited Feb. 10,
2007).
157 Id.
158 Id.

159 International
Justice
Project,
Kelsey
Patterson
Case
Overview,
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/illnessKPatterson.cfm (last visited Feb. 10,
2007).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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165

In May 1997, Patterson filed for state habeas corpus relief claiming
incompetence to stand trial and ineffective assistance of counsel. 166 The
state court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Patterson's claims,
and recommended that relief be denied. 167 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed that denial in 1998.168 Patterson next filed for federal
habeas relief in August 1998.169 The district court stayed Patterson's execution, originally scheduled for August 31, 1998, pending the federal habeas proceedings. 170 After evidentiary hearings, a magistrate judge recommended that habeas relief be denied. 171 In 2001, the district court
172
adopted the magistrate judge's findings and denied federal habeas relief.
The district court did, however, grant Patterson a certificate of appealability ("COA") on the issues of his competence to stand trial and ineffective17 3
ness of counsel at the guilt-innocent and sentencing phases of the trial.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Patterson failed to demonstrate "that the
state court's adjudication of his claim of incompetence was based on an
174
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of evidence presented."'
The court based its determination on the fact that every psychiatric expert
who worked with Patterson prior to trial concluded that he was competent. 175 Additionally, it found that Patterson's ramblings and outbursts in
court during the trial were not evidence of his delusions or mental illness. 176
The Fifth Circuit also addressed Patterson's competence to be executed under Ford.17 7 The court held that Patterson was competent to be
executed at the time of the state habeas hearing based on his knowledge
that he would be executed and the reason for it. 178 The court held that state
courts should have the opportunity to revisit the issue of Patterson's competency to be executed because more than three years time had passed
since the state proceedings, and because of evidence that Patterson's delu-

165

Id.; see also Patterson v. Cockrell, No. 01-40447, 2003 WL 21355999 (5th Cir. May

23, 2003).
166 id.

Id.
Id.
169 Id.
170 Patterson v. Cockrell, No. 01-40447, 2003 WL 21355999 (5th Cir. May 23, 2003).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Patterson v. Cockrell, No. 0 1-40447, 2003 WL 21355999 (5th Cir. May 23, 2003).
167

168

175 Id.

Id.
Id.
178 Patterson v. Cockrell, No. 01-40447, 2003 WL 21355999 (5th Cir. May 23, 2003).
176
177
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sions had progressed. 1

Following another unsuccessful round of appeals in state court, and
again in both the district court and the Fifth Circuit, Patterson's claims of
incompetence to stand execution were again denied. 180 Using transcripts
from the lower court hearings as well as documents from pro se claims
made by Patterson, the court held that he was competent to stand execution
under Texas law.' 81 The State of Texas executed Kelsey Patterson by lethal injection on May 18, 2004.182
V. ANALYSIS

A. A CloserLook at Atkins v. Virginia
In Atkins v. Virginia the Supreme Court created a blanket protection for mentally retarded defendants, holding it cruel and unusual to execute such individuals.18 3 The Court discussed Eighth Amendment claims
and the standards by which such claims should be analyzed. 184 Quoting
Trop v. Dulles, the Court stated "the basic concept of the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man... The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the profess
of a maturing society.' ' 185 In deciding the case, the Court looked at two
basic factors: judgment of legislatures and whether
death penalty justifica1 86
tion could apply to mentally retarded defendants.
Beginning in 1990, following the execution of Jerome Bowden in
Georgia and the Penry case, many state legislatures began to confront the
issue of executing mentally retarded individuals. Georgia was the first to
179 Id.

Patterson v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2004).
See Pattersonv. Dretke, 370 F.3d at 480.
182 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the United States in 2004,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=839 (last visited Feb. 10, 2007);
David
Carson,
Texas
Execution
Information
Center,
Kelsey
Patterson,
http://www.txexecutions.org/ reports/322.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
183 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding it unconstitutional to
execute a mentally retarded defendant).
184 Id. at 311-12. In analyzing Eighth Amendment claims, the Court explained that a
punishment should be graduated and proportioned to the offense. Id.at 311. The Court
emphasized the importance of analyzing "objective factors" when engaged in a proportionality review. Id. at 312. It noted that the "clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." Id.(citing
PenT v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12.
186 Id. at 313.
180

181
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enact such a statute in 1988.187 Congress followed in 1988 by prohibiting
executions of mentally retarded individuals under the federal death penalty. 8 8 Over the next ten years, eighteen states followed suit.' 89
While the number of statutes prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded individuals was significant, even more persuasive was the progression in legislation as well as an obvious change in national consensus.' 90 The Court noted official positions of several professional organizations as well as religious groups. 191
In addition to looking at national consensus on the issue, the Court
analyzed the relationship between mental retardation and the penological
purposes served by the death penalty. 92 The Court noted that mentally
93
retarded individuals often know the difference between right and wrong.'
However, because of their diminished capacities, they may be incapable of
processing information, communicating, learning from experiences, controlling impulses and understanding the reactions of others.' 94 The Court
stated that while "their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from
criminal sanctions, they do diminish their personal culpability."' 95 The
Court went on to articulate two reasons why the death penalty jurisprudence was consistent with national consensus on the execution of mentally
retarded individuals.196 First, was whether justifications for the death penalty even apply to mentally retarded defendants.197 Second, the Court
stated that the risk "'that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of fac187 See GA. ANN. CODE § 17-7-131 (West 1988) ("In all cases in which the defense of

insanity is interposed, the jury, or the court if tried by it, shall find whether the defendant is:
(E) Guilty, but mentally retarded.").
188 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(l) (West 1994) ("A sentence of death shall not be carried out
upon a person who is mentally retarded").
189 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.130, 532.135, 532.140 (West 1990);
TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-203 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1 (West 1991); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-618 (1993/4); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-9-401 (1993-1994); WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.030 (1993-1994); IND. CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 through 35-36-9-6 (1993-1994);

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4623 (1993-1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney
1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105-01 (1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.1; ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02 (2000-2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2000-2001); FLA.
STAT. § 921.137 (2000-2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000-2001); 2001 N.C. Sess.
Laws page no. 45.
190 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
191Id.The Court noted several organizations that adopted official positions opposing
the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders. Id. at n.2 1. These organizations included
the American Psychological Association, the American Association of Mental Retardation,
representatives of several religious communities and United States Catholic Conference. Id.
192 Id.at 317.
'9'Id.at 318.
194Id.
195Id.
196 Id,

'9'Id. at 318-19.
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tors which may call for a less severe penalty,' is enhanced, not only by the
possibility of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability of mentally
retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face
1 98
of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors."
B. ComparingMental Retardationwith Severe Mental Illness
Before analyzing any possible application of Atkins to mentally ill
defendants, it is helpful to analyze specific similarities between the two.
Mental retardation is classically defined as "a mental disability characterized by significant limitations in intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior expressed in conceptual, social and practical skills."' 99 Mental retardation often appears in childhood and, while a person's life functioning
may improve over time, it is considered a permanent disability. z00 Treatment for mental retardation commonly includes a variety of "supports,"
20 1
i.e., services and strategies that can help achieve optimum functioning.
Generally, it is recommended that treatment be individualized as mental
retardation manifests itself differently in each person it affects.20 2
As previously mentioned, mental illness is defined as "any of various conditions characterized by impairment of an individual's normal cognitive, emotional, or behavioral functioning, and caused by social, psychological, biochemical, genetic or other factors., 20 3 Schizophrenia, a mental
illness suffered by the defendants discussed in this note, is categorized as
chronic, severe and disabling.20 4 Many schizophrenics experience symp98 Id. at 320 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
99 See American Association of Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation,
http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faqmental-retardation.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2007)
[hereinafter AAMR].
200 Id.; see also AAMR, Frequently Asked Questions about Mental Retardation,
http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faqmental-retardation.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
201 See AAMR, supra note 199 (explaining the AAMR's position that providing supports

can improve individual functions and promote self-determination and personal well-being
over time). Nine key areas are suggested: human development, teaching and education,
home living, community living, employment, health and safety, behavior, social and protection and advocacy. Id.
202 See AAMR, Frequently Asked Questions about Mental Retardation,
http://www.aamr.org/Policies/faq_mental-retardation.shtml
(last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
03

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ( th ed. 2000).
4
204 See
National
Institute
of
Mental
Health,
Schizophrenia,

http://www.nimh.nih.gov/healthinformation/schizophreniamenu.cfm

(last visited Feb. 10,

2007) (hereinafter NIMH) (describing definitions of schizophrenia). Positive symptoms of

schizophrenia include: thought disorder, hallucinations, delusions and movement disorder.
Id. Negative symptoms include: lack of emotion and/or pleasure in everyday life, diminished ability to initiate or sustain planned activity and inability to communicate effectively.
Id. Cognitive symptoms include: lack of attention, memory and the executive functions
which allow us to plan and organize. Id.
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toms such as hallucination, delusions, inability to communicate and lack of
attention and memory.20 5 Since the cause of schizophrenia is still unknown, treatment focuses on the use of antipsychotic medications to control severe symptoms. 20 6 Additionally, patients already stabilized on antipsychotic medications can benefit from psychosocial treatment consisting of
illness management education,
cognitive behavioral therapy, family educa20 7
tion and self-help groups.
C. Applying the Atkins Analysis to Mentally Ill Defendants
As previously discussed, the Atkins Court held that executing mentally retarded criminals would be considered "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 0 8 In deciding the case, the
Court considered two main factors: the judgment of state legislatures and
death penalty justifications.0 9
1. Judgment of Legislatures
In Atkins, the Court analyzed viewpoints of both state legislatures
as well as other organizations in addressing the suitability of imposing the
death penalty on mentally retarded offenders. 210 The Court then considered reasons to agree or disagree with their judgments.2 '
As in the case with mentally retarded offenders, there is nationwide
support of state legislatures, courts and other organizations, for excluding
severely mentally ill offenders from receiving the death penalty as punishment for their crimes.21 2 For instance, twenty states list a defendant's
capacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct as a statutory mitigating circumstance.213 Additionally, several states include "extreme men205 See supra note 204.

206 See NIMH, Schizophrenia, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.cfm#definition (last visited Feb. 8. 2007) (discussing the use of atypical antipsychotics to treat serious
psychotic symptoms).
207 Id.
208 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
209 Id. at 313.
210 Id.

211 Id.
212 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1) (2004).
213 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §13A-5-51(6) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.G.1
(Supp. 1988); CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3(h) (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11103(5)(b) (1986 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(f) (West 1985); IND. CODE

ANN. §35-50-2-9(c)(6) (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §532.025(2)(b)7 (LexisNexis 1988);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(e) (1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(4)
(1987 & Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. §99-19-101(6) (f)(West Supp. 1988); MONT.
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tal disturbance" as a mitigating factor. 214 The Model Penal Code ("MPC"),
adopted by several states, also includes provisions for considering mental
illness as a mitigating factor in sentencing for capital crimes. 2|5 The MPC
directs the sentencing court to consider whether "the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."2' 16 The MPC also requires courts to consider whether
"at the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 21of7
law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication."
In addition to support on the state level, there are several national
organizations that express strong opposition to the execution of mentally
ill offenders.21 8 Most recently, Amnesty International released an extensive
2 19
report on the execution of mentally ill offenders in the United States.
The report urges the United States to "rid itself of one of the most shameful aspects of this indecent punishment-the execution of people with serious mental illness., 220 The report also details recommendations for government officials including continued state-level development of criteria
that would exclude mentally ill defendants from the death penalty under an
CODE ANN. §46-18-304(4) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:1 1- 3c(5)(d) (West Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-2000(f)(6) (West 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2929.04(B)(3)
(West 1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(e)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE
ANN. §16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-2-2030)(8) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-3-207(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-264.4.B(iv) (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(6) (West Supp. 1989).
214

See, e.g., ALA. CODE §13A-5-51(2) (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. §5-4-605(1) (1987);

CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3(d) (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West 1985);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 38/9-1(c)(2) (West 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §35-50-2-9(c)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)2 (LexisNexis Supp. 1988); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(b) (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (Supp.
1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(2) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.035.2 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(5)(a) (West 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A2000(f)(2) (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(e)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. §16-3- 20(C)(b)(2) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-2030)(2) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-3-207(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4.B(ii) (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2) (West Supp. 1989). Additionally, extreme distur-

bance is a complete defense in Oregon when the disorder is not the result of a defendant's
intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act and for which there is a "reasonable explanation." OR. REV. STAT. §163.135(1) (1987). Other related factors include the
defendant's emotional state or mentality at the time of the crime. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. §16-11-103(5)(f) (1986 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (1988).
215 See Model Penal Code § 210.6(4) (1962).
216 Id. § 210.6(4)(b).
2:7 Id. § 210.6(4)(g).
218 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
219 See
Amnesty International, The Execution of Mentally Ill Offenders,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR510032006

(last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (dis-

cussing the current state of the law with regard to the execution of mentally ill offenders).
220 id.
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221

"Atkins extension."
The American Bar Association ("ABA") also advocates on behalf
of mentally ill offenders.2 22 In addition to establishing the Task Force on
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty in 2003, several ABA members
joined together in a 2005 symposium sponsored by Catholic University
Law Review to examine positions regarding the death penalty and mental
illness.223
2. Death Penalty Justifications
In Atkins, the Court looked carefully at two death penalty justifications, "retribution and deterrence," and their respective application to mentally retarded offenders.22 a Quoting Enmund v. Florida, the Court held
221

Id.

222 See Symposium, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1113

(2005). See also Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual
Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54
CAm. U. L. REV. 1115, § 2, 3 (2005). The Recommendations state that:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired
their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of their
conduct; (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (c) to conform
their conduct to the requirements of the law. A sentence of death should not be
carried out if the prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity (i) to make a rational decision to forgo or terminate postconviction proceedings available to challenge the validity of the conviction or
sentence; (ii) to understand or communicate pertinent information, or otherwise
assist counsel, in relation to specific claims bearing on the validity of the conviction or sentence that cannot be fairly resolved without the prisoner's participation;
or (iii) to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or to appreciate
the reasons for its imposition in the prisoner's own case.
Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disabilityand the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REV.
1115, § 2, 3 (2005).
223 See Symposium, The Death Penalty and Mental Illb,ess, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 1113
(2005); see also Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisonerson Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles
for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 1169 (2005) (discussing broad solutions
for problem presented by mentally ill prisoners on death row); Ronald S. Honberg, The
Injustice of Imposing Death Sentences on People with Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH U.
L. REV. 1153 (2005) (explaining the inappropriateness of imposing death sentences on
mentally ill offenders); Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder as an Exemption from the
Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 1133
(2005) (reviewing the Task Force recommendations and analyzing potential controversies);
Ronald J.Tabak, Overview of Task Force Proposal on Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 1123 (2005) (explaining the Task Force's proposal with respect to the execution of mentally ill offenders and prisoners).
224 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
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"unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person
'measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering' and
225
hence an unconstitutional punishment.5
With respect to retribution, the Court held that the severity of the
punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender. 26 Over
time, Supreme Court jurisprudence has confined the imposition of the
death penalty to a narrow category of serious crimes. 227 Like mentally
retarded offenders, mentally ill offenders should also be considered less
culpable than the average murderer.228 Certainly, they are less culpable
than those murderers whose crimes fall into the narrow category of capital
crimes. 2 29 Based on their inability to appreciate the severity of their
crimes, an exclusion from the death penalty for mentally ill offenders is
appropriate. 230
With respect to deterrence, the Court held that "it seems likely that
'capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result
of premeditation and deliberation.' 231 In theory, the increased severity of
the punishment will inhibit other criminals from carrying out murders.232
Like mentally retarded offenders, mentally ill offenders often suffer severe
cognitive and behavioral impairments that make them incapable of understanding and processing information, learning from social experiences,
engaging in logical reasoning or controlling impulses.233 Based on these
inabilities, excluding mentally ill offenders from execution will not lessen
the deterrent effect for other mentally ill offenders or even those who are
234
not mentally ill.
According to the above analysis, the execution of mentally ill offenders serves neither social justification for the death penalty.235 Therefore, excluding such defendants from receiving the death penalty as pun225 Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982)).
226 Id.
227 Id. (describing

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), where the Court set aside a

death sentence because the petitioner's crimes did not reflect "a consciousness materially
more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder").
228 See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
229 Id.
230 See supra notes 215-216, 222, 225-226 and accompanying text.
231 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
232 Id.

782, 799 (1982)).

233 See NIMH, Schizophrenia, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.cfm#definition (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (discussing positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia); see also National Mental Health Association, Schizophrenia, http://www.nmha.org/
infoctr/factsheets/5 I.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) (describing symptoms associated with
schizophrenia).
234 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 215-16, 222, 225-26 and accompanying text.
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ishment for their crimes is appropriate.23 6
3. Implications of Extending Atkins to Mentally Ill Offenders
By creating a categorical exemption from the death penalty for severely mentally ill offenders, the fear of executing those less culpable for
their crimes could be put to rest.237 Although the Court in Fordattempted
to protect mentally ill offenders, the states' legislative responses to the
decision have proven to be insufficient. 8 As proof, one could revisit the
cases of several mentally ill defendants, aside from those discussed in this
note, that have either been executed or currently await their executions on
death row.239
Creating a categorical exclusion for severely mentally ill offenders
would require courts to offer alternative sentences, such as life imprisonment or a permanent commitment to an institution. 240 Additionally, a finding of severe mental illness post-sentencing would require commutation of
a prisoner's death sentence. 24' Finally, in order to avoid wrongful execution, prisons would have to utilize mandatory evaluations for those prisoners suspected of suffering from mental illness, but who might refuse psychiatric evaluation.24 2
D. Atkins' Effect on Statutory Schemes in Arkansas, Georgia and Texas
If the Supreme Court were to hand down a categorical exemption
from the death penalty for severely mentally ill offenders, the statutory
schemes in Arkansas, Georgia and Texas would drastically change. Each
state would have to develop legislation to protect mentally ill offenders at
both the sentencing and post-conviction stages.
While each of the three states employs different procedures, each
id.
See Ronald S. Honberg, The Injustice of Imposing Death Sentences on People with
Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH U. L. REv. 1153 (2005) (explaining the inappropriateness
of imposing death sentences on mentally ill offenders).
238 See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. See also Treatment Advocacy
236

237

Center,

Criminalization

of

Americans

with

Severe

Mental

Illnesses,

http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/Fact3.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (describing current statistics as to mentally ill offenders in prisons).
39 See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. See also Treatment Advocacy
Center,
Criminalization
of
Americans
with
Severe
Mental
Illnesses,
http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/Fact3.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (describing current statistics as to mentally ill offenders in prisons).
40 See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
241 Id.
242 Id.
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state legislature would have to carefully consider its scheme to make sure
it would sufficiently protect mentally ill offenders. One thing that Arkansas, Georgia and Texas all have in common is vague statutory definitions
of "insane" and "competent." Each statutory definition utilizes some form
of the requirement that the prisoner understand the nature of, as well as
reasons for, the punishment. It is clear from the cases and the number of
mentally ill inmates executed, that Courts overseeing competency hearings
are struggling to develop a bright line standard for competency to be executed.
No matter the solution, be it adopting a new federal standard or
utilizing a scheme similar to that created by the ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, the bottom line is that states utilizing
capital punishment would have to change their laws. Despite the likely
difficulty in recreating death penalty schemes to protect the mentally ill,
states like Arkansas, Georgia and Texas will someday be forced to truly
comply with the requirements set out more than twenty years ago in Ford
v. Wainwright.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is too late for Charles Singleton, James Willie Brown and
Kelsey Patterson, a categorical exemption for severely mentally ill offenders would restore humanity to the administration of capital punishment.
Although American society may not be quite ready for this kind of change,
existing state and model statutes, as well as the views of several national
organizations, suggest a movement in favor of sparing the lives of offenders with severe mental illness. While most would agree that mentally ill
defendants should continue to be punished for their crimes, others will
soon realize that despite the fact that executing mentally ill offenders has
already been declared unconstitutional, people continue to slip through the
cracks. Our justice system will only be able to protect these vulnerable
individuals with a sweeping exclusion from a penalty of death.
Stephanie Zywien

